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Real Estate Brokers Liability for Failure
to Disclose: A New Duty to Investigate
The California Court of Appeal, First District recently held, in
Easton v. Strassburger', that a real estate broker representing the seller
has an affirmative duty to make an investigation of the property and
to disclose to a prospective purchaser all material facts pertaining to
the sale.2 Prior to this decision, the duty of a real estate broker to
disclose was limited to facts known and accessible only to the broker. 3
The expansion of the duty to disclose has resulted in uncertainties
regarding the scope of the broker's duty.' This author will examine
the duties of a broker that have traditionally arisen from the relationships between a broker and seller and a broker and a buyer.5
The theories employed to establish the real estate broker's liability
for a breach of the duty to disclose will be presented to demonstrate
the state of the law prior to Easton v. Strassburger.1
An examination of Easton will reveal that the decision creates uncertainty concerning the scope of the duty to disclose. 7 The statutory
provisions regarding the licensing, education, and experience for
brokers in California will be presented. 8 An analysis of the relationship of these requirements to the duty to disclose will expose the flaws
in the recent expansion of that duty. 9 Guidelines will be proposed
for interpreting the duty in relation to the broker's education, experience, and function in a real estate transaction." Finally, two alternatives to the Easton duty to investigate and disclose all material facts
will be offered to demonstrate the need for limitations on the duty."I
Initially, however, this author will examine the limited duty to disclose
in effect prior to Easton v. Strassburger.
1. 152
nying text.
2. 152
3. See
4. See
5. See
6. See
7. See
8. See
9. See
10. See
11. See

Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984); see infra notes 117-64 and accompaCal. App.
infra notes
infra notes
infra notes
infra notes
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infra notes
infra notes
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3d 90, 102, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 390 (1984).
117-18 and accompanying text.
152-56 and accompanying text.
12-56 and accompanying text.
57-90 and accompanying text.
117-64 and accompanying text.
176-91 and accompanying text.
152-64 and accompanying text.
192-206 and accompanying text.
207-26 and accompanying text.
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THE TRADITIONAL DUTY OF

A BROKER To DISCLOSE

The function of a real estate broker in a real estate transaction
is to bring the buyer and seller together and consummate the sale.'"
In addition, the broker negotiates the sales price, arranges financing,
and handles the escrow arrangements. 3 The relationships between the
parties to a real estate transaction give rise to various broker duties
that can result in liability when a breach occurs.' 4

In the typical residential real estate transaction, the broker and seller
enter into a listing agreement.'

fee contract.'

6 The

5

The listing agreement is a contingent

broker earns compensation upon finding a person

who is ready, willing, and able to purchase the property on the seller's

terms during the period of the listing.' 7 The broker's compensation
generally is a commission based upon the purchase price of the
property.'" In contrast to the typical residential real estate situation,
the buyer and seller in most commercial real estate transactions will
have independent representation. ' 9 Similar to the custom in residential

real estate transactions, the broker's compensation for producing a
ready, willing and able20buyer is a commission based on the purchase

price of the property.
The employment of a broker and the completion of a real estate
transaction creates a series of relationships between the broker, buyer,
and seller. 2 ' A contractual as well as a fiduciary relationship exists
between the broker and the seller. 2 If the seller employs the broker
both a contractual and a fiduciary relationship exists between the seller

Froid v. Fox, 132 Cal. App. 3d 832, 840, 183 Cal. Rptr. 461, 465 (1982).
See H. MILLER & M. STARR, CURRENT LAW OF CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE, §§4:1-4:4
(discussion of agency relationships and duties of brokers).
14. See infra notes 57-90 and accompanying text.
15. See H. MILLER & M. STARR, supra note 13 §2:2 at 167; Three types of listings are
generally used: the open listing, the exclusive right to sell, and the exclusive agency listing.
id. §§2:8-2:11; CAL. CIv. CODE section 1086 (all three listing types are listed). Each of the
listing types may be subject to a multiple listing agreement in which the agreements are pooled
and member brokers can cooperate. H. MILLER & M. STARR, §2:14 at 191.
16. See, H. MILLER & M. STARR, supra note 13, §2:16 at 194.
17. Seek v. Foulks, 25 Cal. App. 3d 556, 572, 102 Cal. Rptr. 170, 179 (1972).
18. See, H. MILLER & M. STARR, supra note 13, §2:12 at 167 (commission based on the
gross sale price of the property).
19. Comment, DualAgency in Residential Real Estate Brokerage: Conflict of Interest and
Interests in Conflict, 12 GOLDEN GATE 379, 383 (1982). Commercial transactions, however,
do not always involve two brokers. See, eg., Pepper v. Underwood, 48 Cal. App. 3d 698,
711-12, 122 Cal. Rptr. 343, 353 (1975) (single broker handling the sale and purchase of a motel).
20. See, H. MILLER & M. STARR, supra note 13, §2:2 at 167 (commission in residential
real estate).
21. See infra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.
22. H. MILLER & M. STm, supra note 13, §§2:2, 4:1.
12.

13.
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and the broker.23 In addition, a fiduciary, though not a contractual,
relationship exists between the broker and the buyer. 24 If the buyer
has independent representation, however, as in the typical commerical
transaction, no fiduciary relationship is established between the seller's
25
broker and the buyer.

The contractual relationship between the broker and the seller will
be governed by the listing contract.26 This agreement, however, generally
is provided by the broker and does not offer sufficient protection
for the seller. The contract is composed of standardized language
intended to shield the broker from liability. 28 The contract does not
offer any protection for the buyer. 29 Fiduciary duties that arise from
the relationship of the broker and the buyer, however, do offer certain
protections for the buyer.3 0 The scope of the duties arising from the
fiduciary relationship must be analyzed to demonstrate the extent of
these protections, particularly in the context of the dual agency.
A.

The Fiduciary Relationship

The fiduciary duties arise from the agency relationship of the broker
and the principal and can arise without an actual employment
contract.' The fiduciary duty of the broker is considered to be the
equivalent of a trustee's duty to the beneficiary.32 The duty is stringent;
and any breach is considered fraudulent. An important aspect of
23. See id., H. MILLER & M. STARR, supra note 13, §4:1 at 3 (agency relationships of
brokers).
24. Ford v. Cournale, 36 Cal. App. 3d 172, 180, 111 Cal. Rptr. 334, 339-40 (1973).
25. The absence of a fiduciary relationship between the buyer and the broker, however,
does not preclude the possibility that the broker may be liable under a negligence theory for
failure to disclose. See infra notes 83-91 and accompanying text.
26.
Blank v. Borden, 11 Cal. 3d 963, 969, 524 P.2d 127, 129-30, 115 Cal. Rptr. 31,
33-34 (1974).
27. See Charles B. Webster Real Estate v. Rickard, 21 Cal. App. 3d 612, 613, 98 Cal.
Rptr. 559, 560 (1971) (Standard form supplied by broker).
28. Comment, The Real Estate Broker's Fiduciaryduties: An Examination of Current Industry Standards and Practices, 12 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 145, 149-50 (1984).
29. See id. at 150.
30. See infra notes 31-38 and accompanying text (discussion of fiduciary duty).
31. Beeler v. West American Finance Co., 201 Cal. App. 2d 702, 705, 20 Cal. Rptr. 190,
193 (1962). The agency relationship can be inferred from the acts of the parties, and, therefore,
no employment contract is necessary to establish the agency relationship. See Nizuk v. Gorges,
180 Cal. App. 2d 699, 707, 4 Cal. Rptr. 565, 571 (1960).
32. Rattray v. Scudder, 28 Cal. 2d 214, 222-23, 169 P.2d 371, 376 (1946); CAL. CIV. CODE
2322(3). One commentator has expressed the view that although the law states that the broker's
duty is equivalent to that of a trustee, the broker is able to enter conflict of interest situations
that never would be allowed of a trustee. See Comment, UnprofessionalConduct by Real Estate
Brokers: Conflict of Interest and Conflict in the Law, 11 PAc. L.J. 821, 826 (1980).
33. Ramey v. Meyers, 111 Cal. App. 2d 679, 245 P.2d 360 (1952) (gratuitous agent held
liable for fraud); see also H. MILLER & M. STA.RR, supra note 13, §4:21 at 63.
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the fiduciary duty is the requirement that the broker fully disclose
all known material facts that might affect the principal's decision to
enter into the transaction.3" The broker must disclose facts that might
be adverse to the broker's own interest in completing a transaction
and collecting the commission. 3"

The fiduciary duty also requires the exercise of reasonable skill,
care, and diligence in the performance of the broker's duties.' 6 Furthermore, the broker has a duty to account to the principal for all
moneys entrusted to the broker.37 These fiduciary duties run to both
the buyer and the seller when the broker is representing both parties.

The broker may be in a compromising position, however, when
representing both parties to the transaction in a dual agency.38
B.

Dual Agency

A broker representing both the seller and the buyer in a dual agency
owes a fiduciary duty to both.3 9 A dual agency is created not only

when the listing broker is acting in a dual capacity, but also when
a sub-agency relationship exists between the listing broker and a
cooperating broker.40 Under the common law, the cooperating broker
is an agent of the listing broker and, therefore, the agent of the party
employing the listing broker.4'

The dual agency is the customary arrangement in a residential real
estate transaction. 2 A dual agency is permitted under California law
if the broker fully discloses the nature of the dual representation to

each of the principals.43 The broker owes an identical fiduciary duty
34. Batson v. Strehlow, 68 Cal. 2d 662, 675, 441 P.2d 101, 110, 68 Cal. Rptr. 589, 598
(1968).
35. Comment, supra note 19, at 380.
36. Ford, 36 Cal. App. 3d 172, 180-82, 111 Cal. Rptr. 334, 340 (1973); H. MILLER &
M. STARR, supra note 13,.4:19 at 58.
37. See, Halloway v. Thiele, 116 Cal. App. 2d 68, 72, 253 P.2d 131, 133 (1953); H. Mn.LR
& M. STA'rR, supra note 13, §4:20 at 61.
38. See infra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.
39. Jorgensen v. Beach 'n' Bay Realty, Inc., 125 Cal. App. 3d 155, 162, 177 Cal. Rptr.
882, 886-87 (1981).
40. Comment, supra note 19, at 388-89. Dual capacity includes the situation in which the
individual broker represents both the buyer and seller and the situation in which the cooperating
broker is from the same brokerage entity as the listing broker. Id. A sub-agency relationship
is created when the cooperating broker is from a different firm or entity. Id.
41. Hale v. Wolfson, 276 Cal. App. 2d 285, 290, 81 Cal. Rptr. 23, 27 (1969); Kruse v.
Miller, 143 Cal. App. 2d 656, 660, 300 P.2d 855, 857-58 (1956).
42. See, Comment, supra note 19, at 383 (the typical relationship is a dual agency).
43. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §10176(d) (the broker is subject to sanctions for not informing all parties to the transaction). See also H. MILLER & M. STARR, supra note 13, §4:18 at
56-57. Miller and Starr state that the required "knowledge and consent is rarely given in the
ordinary transaction." H. MILLER & M. STARR, supra note 13, §4:18 at supp. 19.
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to each of the principals" and, therefore, has the same duty of
disclosure to each principal.4 5
Inherent in the dual agency, however, is a conflict of interest for
the broker." The two principals have competing interests that the
broker must attempt to reconcile. 47 The seller wants to receive the
highest possible price for his property." On the other hand, the buyer
wants to purchase the property at the lowest possible price.4 9 The
broker is unable to act in the best interests of both principals when
their interests are so diametrically opposed.5 0 Additionally, the broker
has separate and distinct self-interest in completing the sale and earning
a commission. 5 The conflicts particularly are acute if the broker has
not fully disclosed the nature of the dual agency relationship and the
principals are unaware of the broker's divided loyalties.52
Although the fiduciary duty of the broker encompasses several
duties, the most important aspect is the duty of disclosure. 5 The duty
to disclose is important because of the reliance placed upon the broker
by the buyer and the seller. 54 If the broker fails to disclose a material
fact, the principals cannot make an informed decision regarding the
sale of real estate.5 5 Since the duty to disclose may arise in a number
of situations, breach of the duty is a frequently litigated issue in real
estate broker liability suits. 56 Although various theories of liability
have been employed by principals against brokers for ill begotten real
estate transactions, a theme central to all such causes of action is
breach of the duty to disclose material facts.
THEoRIms OF LiABIITY
Several theories may be employed to establish the liability of a real
44. See Bateson, 68 Cal. 2d 662, 675, 441 P.2d 101, 110, 68 Cal. Rptr. 589, 598.
45. CAL. CIV. CODE §2020.
46. Comment, supra note 19, at 392 (discussion of the conflicts between the interests of
the principals).
47. See H. MILLER & M. STARR, supra note 13, §4:18 at 55 (using this example).

48.

Id.

49.

Id.

50. Id.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Comment, supra note 28, at 173-74.
Id.at 164.
See Comment, supra note 32, at 833 (discussion of the broker's duty to disclose).
Easton, 152 Cal. App. at 101, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
Id.; See also notes 136-43 and accompanying text.
H. MILLER & M. STARR, supra note 13, §4:16 at 39; as Justice Cardozo stated: "Cons-

tant are the opportunities by concealment and collusion to extract illicit gains. We know from
our judicial records that the opportunities have not been lost." Roman v. Lobe, 152 N.E.
461, 462, quoted in Comment, supra note 32, at 821.
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estate broker for a breach of fiduciary duty, specifically, breach of
the duty to disclose. 57 The breach of contract approach applies when
a contract exists between the parties. 5" In most instances, the contract exists between only the broker and the seller.5 9 As discussed
previously, the contract probably will not offer sufficient protection
for the seller because the terms generally are dictated by the broker.60
In addition, the listing agreement often does not express the specific
duties the broker will perform. 6 Clearly, the contract does not offer
62
protection against deficient disclosure to a seller in this situation.
Furthermore, since the contract is between the seller and the broker,
the contract has no applicability to the buyer. 63 Since breach of contract does not offer protection for the buyer, an available alternative
theory of liability is fraud.
A.

Fraud

The theory of liability usually relied upon to establish a breach of
fiduciary duty, including the duty to disclose, is fraud. 64 Fraud can
be broken down into three distinct categories: intentional misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, and negligent misrepresentation. These
categories are easily defined and differentiated.
Recovery for intentional misrepresentation requires proof of five
specific facts. 65 An intentional misrepresentation of a material fact
must be made.66 The misrepresentation must be made with knowledge
of the falsity of the statement. 67 The statement must be made with
the intent to induce reliance by the person to whom the statement
is directed. 68 The person must have justifiably relied, 69 and the person
must suffer damages as a result of the misrepresentation. 70
Closely related to intentional misrepresentation is fraudulent
See infra note 58-90 and accompanying text.
H. MILLER & M. STARR, supra note 13, §5:7 at 105.
59. See Comment, supra note 28, at 149-50 (discussion of the standardized real estate
contracts).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. (the contract is worded to protect the broker).
63. See, H. MILER & M. STARR, supra note 13, §5:7 at 105 (the contract is an employment contract between the broker and the seller; the buyer is not a party to the contract).
64. H. MILLER & M. STRR, supra note 13, §1:78, fn. 1 at 109.
57.

58.

65.

See id., §1:77 at 107.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See, eg., Gonsalves v. Hodgson, 38 Cal. 2d 91, 100-01, 237 P.2d 656, 662 (1951).
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 100-01, 273 P.2d at 662.
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concealment. 7' Fraudulent concealment also requires proof of the same

five elements. The misrepresentation, however, is made when the broker

fails to disclose a known material fact. 72 This cause of action differs
from intentional misrepresentation in that the broker need not make

an affirmative, false statement. 73 The mere failure to disclose a known
7
material fact is the misrepresentation.

1

The third category of fraud is negligent misrepresentation or

negligent fraud. 75 Again, negligent misrepresentation may be broken

down into the same five elements. 76 Again, however, the critical difference between intentional misrepresentation and negligent
misrepresentation lies in the type of misrepresentation.7 7 A false statement of a material fact made by the broker without knowledge of
whether true or false, is sufficient to find a misrepresentation. 7 The

broker can be liable for a statement that was made without adequate
investigation for veracity. 79 Simply stated, fraud can be established

by showing that there has been an affirmative misrepresentation of

the true facts,8" the true facts have not been disclosed," or the true

facts were not ascertained. 2 If the buyer cannot use any of the three
illustrated fraud theories, ordinary negligence is a final theory under
which a broker may be liable for a breach of the duty to disclose.
B. Negligence
Negligence is a rapidly expanding basis of real estate broker liability for failure to disclose.83 An important difference between fraud
and negligence is that a fiduciary relationship between the broker and

the injured party is not required to establish negligence.8" A broker

may be liable for negligence to an injured third party who was not
71.
72.
73.
74.

See Lingsch v. Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 738, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 206.
Id.
See id.at 735, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 204.
Id.
75. H. MILLER & M. SrARR, supra note 13, §4:24 at 67.
76. See Gonsalves, 38 Cal. 2d at 100-01, 237 P.2d at 662 (elements of fraud).
77. See Wilbur v. Wilson, 179 Cal. App. 2d 314, 316,17, 3 Cal. Rptr. 770, 772-73 (1960).
78. See, eg., Walters v. Marler, 83 Cal. App. 3d 1, 17, 147 Cal. Rptr. 655, 664 (1978)
(negligent fraud case).
79. Id.
80. Brady v. Carmen, 179 Cal. App. 2d 63, 67, 3 Cal. Rptr. 612, 615 (1960).
81. Lingsch, 213 Cal. App. 2d at 735, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 204.
82. Waters, 83 Cal. App. 3d 1, 17, 147 Cal. Rptr. 655, 664.
83. H. MILER & M. STRR, supra note 13, §4:26 at supp. 43 (the extent of the duty
has not been fully developed). The broker's duty had been the same for negligence and fraud.
See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text (discussion of the broker's duty).
84. H. MILLER & M. STARR, supra note 13, §4:26 at supp. 42-43.
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represented by the broker."' If the broker breached the duty to disclose
to the buyer liability for negligence will exist.16 Traditionally, the duty
of the broker was limited to disclosing known facts.87 This formulation of the duty limited the ability of a buyer to establish liability
of the broker for negligence because the broker needed knowledge
of the facts in order to be liable. 8 Liability, therefore, was established
under the fraud theories discussed previously."9 The courts found the
requisite fiduciary duties running to all the parties to the transaction.9"
Recently, however, there have been expansions of the duty to disclose.
1. Expansions of negligence liability for failure to disclose.
In George Ball Pacific,' the real estate broker was representing
a lessee of a warehouse. 2 The warehouse was not owned by the lessor,
but was held in a sale-leaseback1 3 The sale-leaseback was a fact of
common knowledge in the brokerage community. ' The broker never
represented that the lessor was the owner of the warehouse, but neither
did the broker ascertain who the record owner was." When the lessor
owner forced the lessee to renegotiate
went into bankruptcy, the record
96
the lease at a higher rental.
The lessee brought an action against the broker to recover the additional rent.97 The court held that the nature and extent of the actual knowledge of the broker was not determinative of whether the
duty of the broker to disclose had been satisfied. 9 The court stated
that an inquiry into whether the broker had met the community standard was required.99 The community standard would have required
85. See id. The broker's liability would depend upon whether the broker owed a duty
of care to the injured party. Id. With respect to the broker's duty to disclose, the duty runs
to all parties to the transaction. Id.; see, e.g., Earp v. Nobmann, 122 Cal. App. 3d 270, 290,
175 Cal. Rptr. 767, 779 (1981) (the factors to be considered to determine if the broker owes
a duty of care to an individual).

86.

See, e.g., id. (broker liable for negligence for failure to disclose).

87.

Lingsch, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 204 (the same duty applies to fraud

and negligence actions),
88.

Id.

89. See supra notes 64-82 and accompanying text (discussion of fraud theories).
90.
did not
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Hale v. Wolfson, 276 Cal. App. 2d 285, 290, 81 Cal. Rptr. 23, 27 (1969) (broker
have to meet the seller to become the seller's agent and to owe the seller a fiduciary duty).
117 Cal. App. 3d 248, 172 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1981).
Id. at 253, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 600.
Id. at 254, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 600.
Id. at 255, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 600.
Id. at 254, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 600.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 256, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 601.
Id.
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the broker to ascertain the name of the record owner.' In effect,
the court held that the duty to disclose encompassed facts that the
broker should have known.'
A second expansion of the duty to disclose occurred in Pepper v.
Underwood. 2 One real estate broker was handling the sale of a
motel.0 3 The broker used summaries of income tax information to
determine the profitability of the motel for the purchaser.0 4 In reliance
upon the profitability information supplied by the broker, the purchaser decided to purchase the motel.0 5 The broker later received information that indicated the information supplied to the buyer was
incorrect.0 6 The broker, however, did not disclose the corrected in07
formation to the buyer.1
The court held that the code of ethics of the National Association
of Realtors (NAR) °s could be used as rebuttable evidence of the standard of care for real estate brokers. 0 9 The court did not rely upon
a specific canon of the code of ethics, but, rather, expressed the view
that the code of ethics could be used as a guide in the retrial of the
case." One canon of the NAR code of ethics states that Realtors
have an affirmative obligation to discover adverse factors that a
reasonably competent and diligent investigation would disclose."' If
this canon were used as the standard of care for real estate brokers,
the broker would have an affirmative duty to investigate." 2
In Easton, the Califonia Court of Appeals, First District, expanded
the duty of the real estate broker in a manner similar to the approach
taken by the Pepper court." 3 While neither George Ball nor Pepper
were cited in Easton, they do indicate a movement toward a more
expansive duty of disclosure for real estate brokers." ' The expansion
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 48 Cal. App. 3d 698, 122 Cal. Rptr. 343 (1975).
103. Id. at 703, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 704, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 704, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
108. See H. MILLER & M. STARR, supra note 13, §6:33 (discussion of the NAR).
109. 48 Cal. App. 3d at 714, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 355.
110. Id. (the court referred to the code of ethics of the National Assocation of Real Estate
Agents rather than National Associations of Realtors, Id. But in H. MILLER & M. STARR,
supra note 13 §4:26 at supp. 46, the authors state that the court held that the code of ethics
of the NAR could be used. Id.
111. NATIONAL ASSOCATION OF REALTORS, CODE OF ETHICS, Article 9 (1974).
112. Id.
113. See supra notes 102-12 and accompanying text (approach taken in Pepper to expand
the broker's liability).
114. 117 Cal. App. 3d at 256, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 601, 48 Cal. App. 3d at 712-13, 122 Cal.
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of the duty of the broker to make an affirmative investigation of
'
the property for the benefit of the buyer took place in Easton."
As a result of the decision in Easton, the nature and extent of the
broker's duty to disclose has become uncertain." 6
EASTON V. STRASSBURGER

Traditionally, the broker's duty to disclose entailed revealing all
known material facts that would affect an individual's decision to
enter into a transaction. ' In addition, a finding of liability required
that the facts to be disclosed were available only to the broker or
principal. "I
Easton marks a dramatic expansion of the scope of a real estate
broker's liability. In Easton, a broker was employed by the seller of
a house located in an area that contained adobe soil with a history
of landslide activity. ' 9 The seller knew that the house had slid previously
and had been repaired, but did not inform the broker of this
knowledge or fact.' 20 Netting on a slope near the house and an uneven
floor in the guest house indicated that the property had been subject
to slide damage.' 2' The broker had seen these indications and knew
of their significance.' 22 The broker, however, did not inform the buyer
of the indications of slide damage or their importance. 23 Subsequent
to the sale, 24 the house was damaged further by massive earth
movements.
The buyer brought a negligence action against the broker. 25 The
court held that a broker representing a seller has a duty to conduct
an investigation of the property for the benefit of the buyer and to
disclose any material facts affecting the value or desirability of the
property. 26 The court further stated that the broker does not need
to have actual knowledge of the material facts27 nor must the facts
be only accessible to the broker or principal.'
Rptr. at 354; see also notes 91-107 and accompanying text.
115. Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 102, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
116. See infra notes 152-64 and accompanying text.
117. Lingsch, 213 Cal. App. 2d at 735, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 204.
118. Id.
119. Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 96, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 386 (1984).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 96, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
125. Id. at 97, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
126. Id. at 102, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
127. Id. at 102-03, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
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The refusal of the court to limit the extent of the required disclosure
to facts that the broker has actual knowledge of is similar to the
viewpoint of the court in George Ball Pacific.'28 The broker may be
liable for what the broker should have known, because actual
knowledge of the fact is not required.' 29 The Easton holding also is
very similar to the approach taken in Pepper.3 The court in Easton,
like the court in Pepper, stated that the code of ethics of the NAR
could be used as evidence of the standard of care required of real
estate brokers. 3 '
In Easton, the court rested the decision on two bases. First and
most significantly, the court relied upon the rule expressed in two
prior cases.' These cases held that a broker has a duty to disclose
to the buyer all material facts affecting the value or desirability of
the property that are known or accessible to the broker or the principal only.' 33 Both cases were fraud actions, while Easton was grounded
on negligence. 3 4 The same duty of disclosure, as noted previously,
35
applies for both negligence and fraud actions.
The court in Easton acknowledged that no appellate court had ruled
on the issue of the duty of a real estate broker to investigate and
disclose facts the broker should have known. 36 In addition, the court
recognized the broad scope of the articulated duty to investigate and
disclose. 37 The court stated, however, that the holding was implicit
in the prior rule of disclosure.' 38 The court reasoned that if the duty
to investigate was not a part of the duty to disclose, the purposes
39
of the duty could not be met.
One purpose for requiring a broker to disclose material facts to
the buyer is to protect the buyer from an unethical broker and seller.' 4
Furthermore, disclosure will supply the buyer with sufficient information to make an informed decision on whether to purchase the
128. 117 Cal. App. 3d 248, 173 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1981).
129. Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 103, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390-91.
130. Pepper, 48 Cal. App. 3d at 714, 122 Cal. Rptr. 343 (1975).
131. Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 101, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 389-90.
132. Lingsch, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1963); Cooper v. Jevne, 56 Cal.
App. 3d 860, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1976).
133. 213 Cal. App. 2d at 635, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 205, 56 Cal. App. 3d at 866, 128 Cal.
Rptr. at 727.
134. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 96, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
135. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 99, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 99-100, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
140. Id.
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property. 4 ' The court in Easton stated that if the duty to investigate
was not included as a part of the broker's duty to disclose, the broker
would be rewarded for remaining ignorant of reasonably discoverable
defects.' 42 The court found that the broker was in the best position
to provide information to the buyer and often was relied upon to
do so.143

The second and closely related basis for the Easton decision is the
pertinent realities of the situation.'44 Buyers rely upon brokers to protect their interests even though the broker represents the seller. 4 ' As
previously noted, the buyer often does not have separate representation in a real estate transaction.' 6 When a dual agency exists, the
need for disclosure to the buyer becomes stronger because the buyer
effectively is unrepresented by the broker.'47 Furthermore, the broker
can meet the established duty to investigate relatively easily because
brokers often impose upon themselves an obligation to conduct an
investigation as a matter of recognized professional ethics.' 8
The court in Easton took judicial notice of the NAR code of ethics
as an indication of the relative ease with which the broker can meet
the duty to investigate.' 9 The court stated that the duty to investigate
expressed in the NAR code of ethics is not only binding on realtors,
but is an implicit duty imposed upon all real estate brokers.' 0 The
court implied that since the duty to investigate is imposed as a formally
recognized professional obligation, the holding created no additional
burden on the broker to conduct an investigation.' 5 '
The duty of a broker to disclose material facts has been expanded
to encompass not only making the disclosure but making an affirmative investigation to discover material facts. 2 The duty to disclose
has thus become the duty to investigate and disclose.'53 The decision
in Easton can be criticized for expanding unnecessarily the liability
of the real estate brokers.' The court stated that the plaintiffs did
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.
Id. at 100, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
Id.
Id. at 101, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
Id.

146. See supra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

See
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See

152 Cal. App. 3d at 102, n. 8, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390, n. 8.
at 101-02, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 389-90.
at 101, n. 5, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 389, n. 5.
at 102, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390.

id.at 96, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
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not need to show actual knowledge of the soil problems to establish
negligence. 5 5 Unlike negligence, intentional misrepresentation and
fraudulent concealment require a showing of actual knowledge. 5 6 The
court, however, did not fully address the issue of fraudulent concealment by the real estate broker."5 7 The broker in Easton did have actual knowledge of the indications of soil prbblems and the significance
of these indications.' The broker failed, however, to disclose these
indications to the buyer and explain their significance.' 5 9
The misrepresentation necessary for fraudulent concealment is the
act of failing to disclose to the buyer material facts that are known
to the broker.' 60 Since the broker knew of the indications of soil problems and the significance of the indications, the broker probably was
liable for fraudulent concealment based upon the traditional duty to
disclose.' 6 ' By expanding the duty to disclose to include a duty to
investigate, the court went further than was necessary to establish the
liability of the real estate broker.'6 2 The expanded duty to investigate
and disclose creates uncertainty about the extent of the duty of the
broker to disclose material facts. 63 The breadth of the duty expressed
in Easton requires an examination of guidelines to limit future inter64
pretations of the duty.'
LIMITATIONS ON THE EASTON DUTY

Protecting a buyer against injury from unscrupulous real estate
brokers in situations in which the buyer is at a disadvantage is a goal
worthy of attainment.' 65 The soundness of the Easton rule, however,
will depend upon future interpretations of the duty.'66 Easton is an
easy case to find liability on the part of the broker because the broker
was culpable by not disclosing facts that were relevant to the buyer's
decision. 67 Broad interpretation of the Easton rule, however, would
155. Id. at 98, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
156. Id.
157. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text (discussion of fraudulent concealment).
158. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 97, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
159. Id.
160. Lingsch, 213 Cal. App. 2d at 735, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 205 (mere non disclosure is enough
of a misrepresentation for fraudulent concealment).
161. See id. (fraudulent concealment under the traditional duty to disclose).
162. See 152 Cal. App. 3d at 96, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
163. See supra notes 152-59 and accompanying text (uncertainty of the broker's duty).
164. See infra notes 165-226 and accompanying text.
165. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 99-100, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
166. See infra notes 167-206 and accompanying text.
167. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 96, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
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result in brokers becoming liable for a broad spectrum of defects.' 68
The broker's duty to investigate should be limited to those factors
that are within the professional expertise and experience of the
broker. 69 A second limitation is to restrict the duty of the broker
to disclosure of the existence of a defect without requiring a full investigation of the extent of the defect. 7 ' By limiting the duty in this
manner, the interests of both the buyer and the broker are served.' 7 '
Because the broker is considered a professional, the broker is held
to a higher standard of care.'" As a result of the high standard of
care, the liability of real estate brokers for a failure to disclose is
expanded.' 7 The status of a broker as a professional is based upon
the education and licensing requirements of brokers.'"" A second and
closely related factor in establishing the broker as a professional is
the extent of experience in real estate transactions the individual broker
has. '71 These requirements must be discussed to establish the extent

of the broker's education and the limits on the duty to investigate
and disclose.
A.

Education and Experience Requirements

To become a real estate broker, an individual must meet certain
minimum experience and education requirements.' 76 Upon satisfying
these requirements the individual must be licensed by the state.'" The
license is valid for four years.' 78 As a condition of renewal, the broker
must complete a program of forty-five hours of continuing education
in approved real estate courses. 79 The education and experience requirements may be satisfied in one of two manners.' 0 First, an applicant is eligible to become a real estate broker after holding a real
168. Id. at 103, 199 Cal. Rptr. 390-91 (the duty expressed does not have many limitations
placed on future interpretations).
169.

See infra notes 176-191 and accompanying text.

170. See infra notes 196-206 and accompanying text.
171.
172.

152 Cal. App. 3d at 99-100, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
Id. at 104-05, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 392 (because brokers are professionals they are ex-

pected to make use of their superior education).
173.

Id.

174, See at 100.01, 199 Cal, Rptr. at 388 (the broker is called into the profession with
a knowledge greater than the principals).
175. Id, at 100, 199 Cal. Rptr. 388-89.
176. See infra notes 177-191 and accompanying text.
177. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§10150.6 (experience and training qualifications), 10153.2 (required courses for real estate broker applicants).
178.

CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE 10153.6.

179.

Id. §10170.5 (renewal of license, required education courses).

180.

Id. §10150.6.
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estate salesperson license for at least two of the preceding five years
and meeting the educational requirements for a real estate broker's
license. 8 ' Second, an applicant is eligible to become a real estate broker
after completing the equivalent of two years of general real estate
experience or graduating from a four year college program in real
estate.' The applicant must seek the approval of the commissioner
of the Department of Real Estate (DRE)
by filing a petition that states
83
the qualifications of the applicant.
An applicant for a real estate broker's license must complete courses
in real estate economics or accounting, legal aspects of real estate,
real estate finance, and real estate appraisal.'8 4 The education requirements are intended to raise the broker to the level of a
professional.' 5 When both the education and experience requirements
are satisfied, the applicant must pass a licensing examination administered by the DRE.' 8
The examination is intended to ensure that the applicant has the
basic skills necessary to conduct real estate transactions." 7 The license
examination tests for an appropriate knowledge of the English language
related to real estate transactions.' 88 An applicant also is tested for
an understanding of the principles of real estate transactions and the
contracts employed in these transactions. 8 9 In addition, the examination tests for a general understanding of agency obligations, real estate
practice, and the canons of ethics.' 90 Once an applicant passes the
examination, a license must be issued and the new real estate broker
is ready to conduct business. 19'
Clearly, the duty to investigate and disclose presents no problem
when the material fact in question squarely is within the education
181. Id. §10150.6. To meet the education requirement, the applicant must have been a real
estate salesperson actively involved in the real estate business. Id. A real estate salesperson

differs from a real estate broker. Id. A real estate salesperson must work for a real estate
broker and the real estate broker has a duty to supervise the salesperson. Id. In addition,

the broker is liable for the acts of the salesperson. Id. §10131, §10132.
182.
183.
184.

Id. 10150.6.
Id.
Id. 10153.2.

185.

See Smith, Professionalizationof Real Estate Brokers-A Realistic Goal?, 43 Los

ANGELES BAR BULL., 499, 501 (1968) (authored by former Real Estate Commissioner, Burton

E. Smith).
186.
187.

CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §10153.
See Smith, supra note 185, at 500 (discussion of the education and experience re-

quirements for brokers).
188.

CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §10153(a).

189. Id. §10153(b).
190.

Id. §10153(c).

191. Id. §10150.6 Once the applicant passes the examination and satisfies the other requirements, the Commissioner may issue a broker's license. Id,
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and expertise of the broker.' 9 2 A problem arises, however, when the
material fact in question is not within the education and experience
of the broker.' 93 As established previously, the education and expertise
194
of the broker are the bases for the broker's status as a professional.
If the material fact is not within the education and expertise of the
broker, to hold the broker responsible for investigating and discovering the defect would be unreasonable.'"
A second proposed limitation on the duty imposed by Easton is
to restrict the investigation to the discovery and disclosure of a
defect.'" The court in Easton states that the broker was negligent
because the broker did not request that the soil stability be tested. 19'
This implies that a disclosure of the soil damage indications alone
would be insufficient to discharge the duty of the broker to investigate
and disclose.1 98 Based on the purposes behind the duty, to protect
the buyer and provide sufficient information for the buyer to make
an informed decision, the broker could sufficiently discharge the duty
to disclose by informing the buyer of the indications and the
significance of the indications.' 99 Requiring further investigation as
to the extent of the defect, however, is not necessary.2"' Upon learning of the indications of a defect, the buyer may choose to conduct
an independent investigation and then make the proper decision.2 0 '
The court in Easton stated two reasons for expanding the duty to
disclose; to protect the buyer from an unethical broker and to provide the buyer with sufficient information to make an informed decision whether to purchase. 20 2 As a result of the Easton decision, the
extent of the duty of the broker has become uncertain. The broker
does not know which material facts are within the duty to investigate

192.

The education requirements outline specifically the areas in which the real estate broker

is expected to be knowledgable.
193. See infra notes 194-195 and accompanying text.
194. See Smith, supra note 185 at 500; H. MILLER & M. STARRt supra note 13, §4:26 at
supp. 43 (education as a requisite to professional status).
195. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 101, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390 (duty to discover reasonably discoverable
defects).
196. See infra notes 197-206 and accompanying text.

197. Easton, at 98, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 99-100, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388 (discussion in Easton on purpose for duty); see
also H. MILLER & M. STARR, supra note 13, §4:16, n. 2 at supp. 20.

200. Easton at 99, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
201.

See 152 Cal. App. 3d at 100, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388-89 (the purpose of the duty will

have been met once the information is disclosed and explained).
202.

152 Cal. App. 3d at 99-100, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
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and disclose. 2 3 The court did not limit the duty to known facts and,
therefore, the broker will be liable for facts that should have been
discovered.2"4 To reduce the uncertainty, the duty to investigate can
be narrowly interpreted, consistent with the reasons for expansion cited
by the court.
By limiting the investigation to material facts that are within the
education and expertise of the broker, the broker is not placed in
a position of being liable for defects that are beyond the ability of
the broker to discover.2"' The buyer, on the other hand, is protected
because the presence of a defect will be disclosed and the buyer will
be in a position to obtain additional information to make a proper
decision on whether or not to purchase.20 6 In the event that an interpretation of the duty to investigate and disclose, as described above,
does not protect the buyer, two legislative alternatives are available.
B.

Legislative alternatives

Two legislative alternatives exist that would protect the buyer without
causing undue uncertainty for real estate brokers. One alternative is
expansion of the education and experience requirements for the real
estate broker. Another alternative is to eliminate the dual agency.
As noted previously, the education and experience requirements are
the bases for the broker's status as a professional.2 7 In addition,
because the broker is a professional, the broker is held to a high
standard of care.20 8 The high standard of care translates into the expanded duty to investigate and disclose.20 9 Since the education and
experience of the broker is vital to the broker's status as a professional, expanding the education requirements by including additional
areas would allow for expansion of what could reasonably be included

203. See Stevens v. Hutton, 71 Cal. App. 2d 676, 163 P.2d 479 (1945) (brokers did not
know and did not have reason to know of the defects); see also H. Mu.XER & M. STRR,
supra note 13 §4:16, n.13a at supp. 23.
204. Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 102-03, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390-91 (the court does not
establish any guidelines for interpreting the duty).
205. See supra notes 176-191 and accompanying text (the education requirements of a broker)
(the use of the education requirements as a guideline for interpretation of the duty give guidance
to brokers).
206. Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 101, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388 (purposes of the duty to
investigate and disclose).
207. See supra notes 176-91 and accompanying text (education requirements).
208. Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 101-02, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 389-90 (the broker is a professional with expertise and knowledge).
209. Id.
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in the broker's duty to investigate.210 By expanding the broker's required education to include topics that impact upon a buyer's decision to purchase, the facts that reasonably could be included in the
duty to investigate would likewise be expanded.
Easton created a broad duty to investigate and disclose. 21' As noted
previously, the broad duty has resulted in uncertainty as to the extent
of the duty of the broker.212 By limiting the duty to expand education requirements, the uncertainty will be reduced. The broker will
know what facts are within the duty to investigate and disclose.
The second available alternative, eliminating dual agency, addresses
the same interest, protection of the buyer, but does so from a different perspective.2"3 Instead of attempting to define the extent of
the broker's duty to investigate and disclose, elimination of dual agency
attempts to reduce the conflicts that lead to deficient disclosure.2 4
Dual agency creates a conflict of interest for the broker. 2 " The broker
is attempting to advance the divergent interests of two principals. 2 6
The advancement of the interests of the seller is at the expense of
the interests of the buyer.2" 7 If dual agency is eliminated, the broker
will no longer be representing two principals with differing interests.
Eliminating dual agency promotes the use of two brokers for transactions, which is the prevailing practice in commercial real estate
transactions. 21 8 In contrast to the typical commission-based broker,
buyer's brokers operate either on a flat fee or an hourly basis. 219 These
brokers represent only the buyer.22 Because the buyer's broker's compensation is not dependent upon completion of the transaction, the
disclosure of defects to the buyer is not adverse to the interests of
the broker.22 ' The interest of the buyer, in making an informed decision, is satisfied by being informed of the presence of any defects. 22
210. See infra notes 192-95 and accompanying text (limitation of duty to facts within the
education of the broker).
211. Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 102, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
212. See supra notes 152-61 and accompanying text.
213. Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 99-100, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388 (the purposes of the duty).
214. See Comment, supra note 19, at 392 (conflicts of the broker in making the required
disclosure).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 393-94.
218. Id. at 383.
219. Sacramento Bee, Oct. 20, 1984, at 1, col. 1 (discussion of single agency brokers);
See also Comment, supra note 19, at 394-95.
220. Sacramento Bee, Oct. 20, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
221. See Comment, supra note 28, at 162-63 (the broker's interest in completing the sale).

222. Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 100, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388 (purposes for the expanded duty).
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The interests of the buyer and the buyer's broker are, therefore, in
harmony.
The seller also benefits by the simple agency relationship. The seller's
broker is now attempting to further only the interests of one
principal.2 2 3 In a dual agency, if the broker finds a defect for the
benefit of the buyer, as is required under the duty to investigate and
disclose, the broker has defeated the interest of the seller in selling. 224
Absent dual agency, the broker can concentrate on the interests of
the seller and not be as concerned about the interests of the buyer,
as the buyer has separate representation. The seller's broker still would
have a duty to investigate and disclose for the benefit of the buyer,225
but the duty would be unnecessary. The duty is unnecessary because
the purposes for the duty have been satisfied by having separate
representation for the buyer.2 26 The buyer's broker would be making
an investigation for the benefit of the buyer. The seller's broker would
be concentrating on the interests of the seller, not the interests of
the buyer.
The two proposed alternatives to the rule in Easton would serve
the interests of the buyer. The education requirements of the broker
could be expanded, increasing the areas that would be subject to investigation and disclosure by the broker. The second alternative is
to eliminate dual agency and reduce the conflicts of interest of the
broker in representing both the buyer and seller. By eliminating dual
agency, the interests of the buyer are better served and, at the same
time, the interests of the seller are also better served.
CONCLUSION

In California, the real estate broker, as a professional, owes stringent
duties to all parties to a real estate transaction. The two major theories
to establish the liability of a broker who fails to disclose a fact material
to the transaction are fraud and negligence. To be liable for fraud,
the broker must have a fiduciary duty to the person seeking recovery.
The broker owes a fiduciary duty to the broker's principal. Generally, the seller is the broker's principal, unless a dual agency exists.

223. See Comment, supra note 19, at 388 (the interests of the principals that the broker
is attempting to further are opposed).
224. Id.
225. Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 101, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
226. Id. (purposes of the duty).
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In this case, the broker owes a fiduciary duty to both the seller and
the buyer.
A broker's liability for negligence does not require the existence
of a fiduciary relationship. Negligence may be established under an
independent finding of a duty to each party to the transaction. The
real estate broker's duty to buyers has been expanded in Easton. The
new duty is to investigate and disclose defects for the benefit of the
buyer.
The expanded duty to investigate and disclose should not be interpreted broadly. The duty must be interpreted to include only areas
that are within the education and expertise of the broker. In addition, the duty should be limited to investigating and disclosing the
existence of defects rather than fully investigating the extent of the
defect. If the duty is interpreted in this limited manner, the Easton
rule will serve as a useful tool for protecting the purchaser of residential
real estate. Furthermore, a limited interpretation will remove the uncertainties about the extent of the duty of the broker to investigate and
disclose. A broader interpretation will serve as merely another method
for an injured plaintiff to recover at the expense of the real estate
broker.
If the limited interpretation does not adequately serve the purpose
of protecting the purchaser, two alternatives might be more effective.
The first is to expand education requirements to broaden the areas
that can reasonably be included in the broker's expertise. The second
is to encourage the use of two brokers in residential real estate transactions by eliminating the dual agency. Elimination of the dual agency will also remove the conflicts that give rise to the incentives not
to disclose. Clearly, a limited interpretation of the Easton duty can
be molded that will satisfy both the interests of the buyers and of
the brokers.
Stuart Knowles

